US Licensed About Two Dozen Chinese Firms to Handle Nvidia H200 Chips, NYT Reports
The United States Department of Commerce licensed about two dozen Chinese firms to buy or handle Nvidia H200 artificial intelligence chips, and reporters found at least two of them had almost no visible presence at their listed addresses, according to a New York Times investigation reported on 7 November 2026. The report raises questions about how closely Washington vets the buyers of the most powerful AI chip it allows Nvidia to sell to China, but it does not prove that any chip was diverted.
An export licence is a government permission to buy, receive or handle a controlled product, in this case Nvidia H200 chips, subject to conditions set by the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security. The H200 is the most powerful AI chip Washington lets Nvidia sell to China, and access to it is therefore a sensitive test of export controls that are meant to keep advanced AI hardware away from military users while still allowing commercial sales.
The Times investigation, published on 7 November, is the source for the central claim. The newspaper reported that Commerce approved roughly two dozen Chinese firms, according to people familiar with the approvals, and that the full list is not public. The best-known licensees include Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, ZTE, Baidu, BYD and Tesla Shanghai, although actual sales remain small.
The sharpest case in the report is New Matrix, a Beijing company created about 17 months ago and approved earlier in 2026 to assemble H200 chips into AI servers. Reporters who visited its listed address in an industrial park on the north-west edge of Beijing found an empty concrete shell, with wires hanging from the ceiling, no company listing in the building directory, and building management with no record of the firm. People nearby said they had never heard of it. Commerce did not comment on New Matrix specifically.
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What the investigation found about the firms
Corporate records cited by the Times link New Matrix owners to Wise Road Capital, a Chinese private equity fund the United States added to its Entity List in 2024 for helping Beijing acquire sensitive chip technology. The Entity List is the trade blacklist that restricts exports to named foreign parties. One of the main owners, Li Bin, chairs Tsinghua Unigroup and owns New H3C Semiconductor Technologies, which is itself on the Entity List, according to the reporting.
A second licensee, Maginfra, drew similar scrutiny. Reporters visited its listed office in September 2026 and found a small locked room with a few chairs and empty desks, where neighbouring workers had never seen anyone enter. Analysts cited by the Times said Maginfra shares staff and patents with Inspur, a Chinese server maker on the Entity List for its work with the Chinese military, and may be an offshoot of Inspur. That is an analyst view reported by the Times, not a finding by Commerce.
Two more licensees were named in the reporting. Zhejiang Yindun Cloud Technology operates inside data centres owned by Range Intelligent Computing, and its owners are tied to companies that serve the Chinese military, according to the Times. Shanghai Jiatang emerged from state-owned Datang Telecom, which develops military-grade communications and cryptography. No transfer of chips to either firm has been alleged in the reporting, and the ownership links described are not proof that any chip was diverted.
An important detail is what New Matrix and Maginfra were approved to do. Neither was cleared as an end user of the chips. Both were approved to assemble H200 chips into AI servers for a final customer, whose identity is unclear in the reporting. The Times does not establish that either firm received a single H200 processor.
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| Illustration: Rows of server racks with glowing blue, green and orange lights in a data centre |
How the H200 sales were allowed
The approvals sit inside a policy shift made late in 2025. President Donald Trump banned H200-class exports in April 2025, then reversed course in December 2025 and allowed H200 sales to approved Chinese customers, with the United States government taking a 25 percent share of sales under the deal described in the reporting. The Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security, which issues the licences, said it carefully reviews every application, and pointed to 324 million dollars in export penalties imposed in 2025 and more than 90 enforcement officers hired in 2026.
That defence sits uneasily beside the empty offices. If vetting is careful, critics ask, how did firms with no visible staff at their listed addresses pass it? The Times account does not answer that question, because Commerce has issued no public statement on the specific approvals and has not publicly revoked them or confirmed a review.
Readers should be careful with the language used about these firms. Some coverage has called them shell companies or ghost companies, but the Times investigation does not use that as a proven finding, and an empty listed office is not proof of wrongdoing. A new company can be registered at one address while working elsewhere, and a firm can be thinly staffed without breaking the law.
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| Illustration: A technician in a white cleanroom suit and hood, wearing safety glasses and a face mask, holding a silicon wafer in a semiconductor facility |
Why this matters for AI and export controls
The H200 matters because it is the hardware that trains and runs large AI models, and access to it shapes which countries can build frontier AI systems. The United States has used export controls to slow China access to the most advanced chips, while China has invested heavily in domestic alternatives.
The investigation also shows how hard it is to police a supply chain that runs through assemblers, distributors and data centres. A chip approved for one customer can pass through several hands before it is used, and ownership links to blacklisted firms can be hidden behind layers of companies. The Times traced those links through corporate records, but a licensing officer working from an application form may not see the same picture.
For the technology industry, the practical effect is likely to be more scrutiny rather than an immediate ban. Lawmakers and analysts who read the report are likely to ask Commerce for the full list of licensees and the criteria used to approve assemblers. Nvidia investors will watch whether the controversy affects future H200 sales to China, although those sales are currently a small share of Nvidia data centre revenue.
| Named licensee | What the Times reported | What is not established |
|---|---|---|
| New Matrix, Beijing | Approved to assemble H200 servers; listed office was an empty shell; owners linked to Wise Road Capital, on the Entity List since 2024 | No proof any chip was received; no proof of wrongdoing |
| Maginfra | Listed office was a deserted room in September 2026; analysts link it to Inspur, on the Entity List since 2023 | No proof any chip was received; offshoot claim is an analyst view |
| Zhejiang Yindun Cloud Technology | Owners tied to firms serving the Chinese military | No chip transfer alleged |
| Shanghai Jiatang | Emerged from state-owned Datang Telecom, which develops military communications | No chip transfer alleged |
| Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, ZTE, Baidu, BYD, Tesla Shanghai | Approved as larger buyers, cleared for tens of thousands of chips | Actual sales remain small, under 1 percent of Nvidia data centre revenue in the July quarter |
The wider chip politics are covered in our Nvidia will invest 3 billion in Meta report, and the national AI strategy angle is covered in our Canada is buying into Cohere article. For the security context around AI tools, see our Tampered Claude Code extension report, the hub of this cluster.
Key Takeaways
- A New York Times investigation reported on 7 November 2026 that US Commerce licensed about two dozen Chinese firms to buy or handle Nvidia H200 chips.
- New Matrix, approved to assemble H200 servers, had an empty shell at its listed Beijing address, and its owners are linked to Wise Road Capital, on the US Entity List since 2024.
- Maginfra, another approved assembler, had a deserted listed office, and analysts link it to Inspur, blacklisted for work with the Chinese military.
- Neither firm was approved as an end user, and the Times does not establish that either received a single H200 chip, so an empty office is not proof of wrongdoing.
- Commerce has not commented on New Matrix specifically and has not publicly revoked the approvals, while H200 sales to China remain under 1 percent of Nvidia data centre revenue.
Conclusion
The Times investigation does not show that Nvidia H200 chips reached the Chinese military, but it does show that the licensing system approved firms that could not pass a basic address check. Until Commerce explains how those approvals were made, the report will stand as a serious challenge to the claim that H200 exports to China are tightly controlled. The next step belongs to the government, not to the chipmaker.
Sources
Techworthit, Nvidia H200 licenses went to firms with empty offices in China, 9 November 2026
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